**Single-Party Rhetoric versus Multi-Party Programs:
The Irony of the Communist Party of Vietnam**

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Abstract

As the Berlin Wall fell, the number of governments run by Marxist-Leninist doctrines has also declined rapidly. Vietnam is one of the five remaining Communist countries in the world. Instead of committing herself to advance the interests of the proletariat worldwide, Vietnam is scurrying toward capitalism and develops some version of nationalism to spice up the fading Communist ideology. This research focuses on the question of whether the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has begun to moderate its ideological position in reaction to the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe through an analysis of the latest CPV's program, using the coding scheme from the Comparative Manifesto Research Project (CMRP). The analysis of the CPV program tends to confirm the survival strategy of single-party programs; that is, they have to satisfy both the elitist and mass demand in coping with changes within society and trends in international relations. However, insofar as there are no parties to compete, the CPV may monopolize power and remain quite independent from competitive pressure. The leaders of the CPV have more policy room to manipulate and achieve what they want to accomplish in an authoritarian system, whereas countries with a multi-party system may not do so easily because of inter-party pressure. The result also indicates strong nationalist sentiment under which Communism was able to hide itself by claiming legitimacy for the Party's continuous rule. From its birth in 1930 to 1975, the CPV, which assumed various names for different periods of operation, spearheaded struggles against the French colonialists then the Americans under the Nationalist banner. From 1975 when Vietnam was reunified until now, the CPV has usurped the government's power and awarded itself the sole power to rule Vietnam, admitting no opposition. Although the CPV pays lip-service to the socialist orientation throughout its program, the concept is without substance. Facing the inevitable trend of globalization, the CPV is trying to catch up with the capitalist neighbors like Singapore and Thailand by advertising Vietnamese products, people, and country on the global market. In so doing, the CPV is abandoning its socialist content and saying farewell to the proletarian struggle worldwide. Any existing tensions between market economy and central planning will eventually be resolved, perhaps, in favor of the market as evident in the promotion of competition and free market in the program's text. The ideological split in the proletarian struggle finds its way into the CPV's intention to make friends worldwide, even with former enemies like the imperialist United States and other capitalist countries. An outlook toward peace and cooperation is more practical than a call to arms these days. A market orientation also brings in more capital to an impoverished country than the failed command-economy experiment. On top of these agendas, the Communist Party of Vietnam once again crowns nationalism as an ideology for all pragmatic purposes while refusing to step down from power.

Single-Party Rhetoric versus Multi-Party Programs:
The Irony of the Communist Party of Vietnam[1]

As the Berlin Wall fell, the number of governments run by Marxist-Leninist doctrines has also declined rapidly. Today, only five Communist countries remain in the world: Cuba, North Korea, Laos, China, and Vietnam. Instead of uniting on one front to advance the interests of the proletariat worldwide, each country is scurrying at various speeds toward capitalism and develops some version of nationalism to spice up the fading Communist ideology. Those slower to change will loose out both in terms of material gains and identities in the globalization era.

The current research will discuss the case of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). Since its inception in 1930, the CPV has issued two programs to grant itself the vanguard mission of leading the country against imperialism and toward socialist transformation. The CPV has enjoyed a long reign by suppressing all dissenting voices and denying any possibilities for multi-party competition. Now, in the globalization era, the party continues to negotiate a place for Vietnam in the world's market economy. Of the five ruling Communist parties in the world, the CPV provides an "average" case study of economic development and nationalistic agenda. Vietnam has not caught up with China on both ends, but Vietnam is not as stagnant as North Korea, Laos, or Cuba (Human Development Index 2003).

This research focuses on the question of whether the CPV has begun to moderate its ideological position in reaction to the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe through an analysis of the CPV's 1991 program. Analyzing political programs is widely practiced among scholars studying multi-party systems. A prime example is the Comparative Manifesto Research Project (CMRP) group, who studies election programs of parties in most advanced industrialized

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nations (e.g, Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Tanenbaum 2001). Recently, the group has

also begun to examine political programs of parties in new democracies of post-Cold war Europe

and Latin American countries. However, researchers have not examined countries without a

multi-party system. This research will juxtapose the CPV program and the existing CMRP data

from multi-party countries to examine how the former may be described compared to the latter.

Using the CMRP coding scheme to analyze the CPV program, I will show how the CPV

program adapts to the current trends of globalization, how its Communist ideology might have

been diluted at the dawn of economic development, and the pragmatic importance of maintaining

national identity in face of globalization. First, I will describe the nature of single-party

governments and a few classifications that have been ascribed to the state of Vietnam. Then I

will argue that, in the current context of globalization, the CPV probably feels the need to

mobilize nationalist sentiments more than socialist ideology for practical reasons different than

those used during the resistance against the French colonialism or the American imperialism.

Finally, the CPV program will be analyzed in an attempt to classify it and to reinterpret the

nationalist discourse within the context of party's rhetoric.

Single-Party System Classification

For Giovanni Sartori, a single-party system is simply that, "Only one party exists and is allowed

to exist" (1976:221). Expanding on Almond and Coleman's classification scheme (1960),

Sartori emphasized on the ideology-pragmatism criterion in his descriptions of the three types of

single-party systems: one-party totalitarian, one-party authoritarian, and one-party pragmatic.

The ideal-type, totalitarian single party carries an agenda of total ideological transformation of

the society and complete politicization in all aspects of life, so that "no line can be drawn

between state-controlled and private spheres of life" (Sartori 1976:225). The lesser of the two "evils," the authoritarian single-party system, does not aim for total control of the society, but some degrees of ideological mobilization exist for the purpose of maintaining political power. Then there is the pragmatic single party which completely "lacks the legitimation of an ideology" (Sartori 1976:226), but the party holds onto power by negotiating with other factions. Sartori also equated the lack of ideology in the last case to a "loose and somewhat pluralistic" party organization, implying that it is the most tolerant of the three types of single-party systems (1976:226).

Sartori's typology, however, does not account for pragmatic considerations in the allocation of authority in single-party systems. After all, political power concentrated in the hands of a leader or a group of leaders is not to be shared unless there are pre-existing institutions or pressures to do so. A dictatorial ruling party will remain a dictator unless there are internal, popular, or foreign forces demanding that power be contested through democratic means or external pressures. Whether the party is ideologically-driven or purely power-driven is probably not as important as the fact that power is not shared in a single-party system. Hence, it might be difficult to conceive of a single-party system that is "somewhat pluralistic" in the real world unless the system is undergoing a transitional stage.[2] The distinction between ideology and pragmatism probably constitutes a false divide when the end result is still a single-party system with all the possible practical manipulations to cling onto power regardless of the presence of a true ideological belief, or so has been the case of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

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[2] The abundant literature on democratic transition speaks to this particular phenomenon that has been expressed through various modes and means in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the past couple of decades. Skepticism, however, has seeped into the initial optimistic theorizing of transitional democracy as fewer transitional countries progress toward complete democratization and others reverting back to authoritarian regimes.

In an attempt to classify the state of Vietnam,[3] authors have labeled it "bureaucratic socialism" (Porter 1993) or "mono-organizational socialism" (Thayer 1995). "Bureaucratic socialism" refers to the command economy administered by the state apparatus apart from the society (Porter 1993). Meanwhile, "mono-organizational socialism" indicates the party's centralized control of "the state bureaucracy, armed forces, and mass organizations" (Thayer 1995:45). Both labels acknowledge the socialist ideology of the party, which is no longer in vogue. The labels do not recognize, either, another ideology always lurking beneath socialism, and that is nationalism. The entwined relationship between nationalism and socialism, characterized by a strange combination of idealism and pragmatism from the founding moment of the CPV, creates something very unique that the classifications thus far have failed to capture. Thus, this research will make an attempt to re-classify the CPV in the current context. First, it is necessary to examine the relationship between nationalism and socialism within the CPV.

Weaving Nationalism into the Socialist Fabric

As history marked it, nationalism shook Europe in the early-mid 19th century and sowed its seeds subsequently in the European colonies (Smith 2001). Like other colonized peoples throughout the world, different factions of Vietnamese revolutionaries invoked nationalism to demand independence (Anderson 1991; Tai 1992). Under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh (then with the pseudonym Nguyen Ai Quoc), the CPV was founded on February 3, 1930, in Hong Kong. The first political program was also issued on this occasion. The program tied together class struggle and the struggle for independence from colonization (Nguyen Trong Phuc 2002). From the beginning, the CPV has hidden under the shadow of nationalism while co-opting or wiping out

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[3] Because of the overlapping structure and personnel between the government of Vietnam and the CPV as in similar cases of Communist states, this paper will not attempt to distinguish the two but treat them as one body of government.

other nationalist/anti-colonialist factions (Nguyen-vo 1992; Dang Phong and Beresford 1998). In other words, nationalism was the means to achieve Communist ideal. After the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declared independence on September 2, 1945, and as the struggle against colonialism came to an end by the Geneva Accord of 1954, rural Vietnam was among the first to witness *en masse* how class struggle began to surface in the land reform program. With the purpose of nationalizing all lands, the CPV led a mass campaign from 1953-1957 to shatter the traditional structure of land ownership. CPV cadres mobilized poor peasants to accuse their landlords of crimes, sometimes through fabrication, and thousands of land-owners were executed or tortured until death (Moise 1983). Among the accused, many were formerly involved in the revolution against colonialism, and the CPV had betrayed them as they became subjects of elimination on the path toward socialism (Nguyen Trong Phuc 2002:184).

While maintaining a socialist regime north of the 17th parallel from 1954-1975, the CPV led guerilla warfare against the Southern Vietnamese regime backed by the Americans. By 1975, the CPV achieved its final goal of reuniting the country. With its continuous rule, the CPV has retained a relatively strong level of political stability.

Nationalism has become a convenient commodity to legitimize the revolution and the subsequent rule of the CPV. When the Vietnamese people began to recognize how nationalism has been used as a façade for socialism, it was too late for them to turn against the Communists as, for instance, in the case of land reforms. By then, police machinery has been in place and operated well under the socialist-nationalist banner. Similar stories of Communist betrayals spotted the history of China, Russia, and various Eastern European countries (Fischer-Galati 1979; Moise 1983).

In the case of Vietnam, disentangling nationalist strands from the socialist agenda has proven to be a difficult task. At first, nationalism was used to promote socialism. When the command economy reaped failures, and unauthorized liberalization nearly made the norm in many provinces throughout the country, the CPV had to institutionalize a set of reforms to liberalize the economy starting in 1986 (Harvie and Tran Van Hoa 1997).

Coupling with the advent of privatization was the decline in social welfare programs. In a socialist state like Vietnam, health, education, and other social services are supposed to be provided by the government to everyone. Even state-owned enterprises do not have separate service structures for their employees (Griffin 1998). Before *doi moi*, most health and schooling services were centralized with a few exceptions of black-market services. The late 1980's witnessed changes in state's policy to decentralization and budget cutbacks in both areas of health and education. More low-income people have suffered from inadequate health care and unaffordable schooling costs (Prescott 1997). Despite the wane of socialism, nationalism seems to remain a stronghold in the CPV's program.

The curious persistence of nationalism in the CPV's rhetoric can actually serve a pragmatic purpose. While nationalism helped boost the rationale of the fight for independence and reunification of Vietnam before 1975, nationalism after 1986 has been used extensively by the CPV to construct an image and identity of Vietnam in face of the increasingly porous national borders in the time of globalization. Opening up to the world means exposing Vietnam to many desirable as well as unwanted cultural products. The CPV acts as a moral teacher to the mass by crafting policies to filter out the unwanted imports which threaten the Party's rule such as multi-partyism and social evils from the West. At the same time, to keep a market economy running, the CPV must function well as a salesperson advertising Vietnamese cheap labor and

exporting Vietnamese industrious workers to the world. Foreign investments and ideas may

keep flowing in, but the CPV tries its best to be selective between capital and ideology.

Nationalism now becomes a type of decoration on trading entities and mechanisms. Nationalism

helps promote the Vietnamese market to foreign investors just as it did rally support for

independence movements. In all times, the CPV knows how to employ nationalistic symbols

and ideology for self-benefiting purposes.[4]

In the following analyses, the CPV's 1991 program will be compared with existing

programs in the Comparative Manifesto Research Project. We might find that the CPV's

program does not match or resemble the profile of Communist parties in advanced, industrialized

countries such as France. Rather, we may expect the CPV's program to be more similar to that

of some developing countries' Nationalist parties.

The Comparative Manifesto Research Project

Beginning in 1979, a group of European researchers started to collect parties' programs and

analyze them to determine parties' policy preferences (Laver and Budge 1992). By 1989, the

project expanded to include 600-plus parties. A coding handbook was developed, and coders

content-analyzed party programs.

Compared to most effort before the CMRP, which are limited to party behaviors and

static variables (e.g., Castles and Mair 1984), the CMRP has many policy variables which can be

combined or recombined according to research interests. Furthermore, the CMRP data set

spreads over a number of years, so it lends more flexibility and temporal dimensions to the

analysis (Budge and Bara 2001).

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[4] See Nguyen-vo's Ph.D. dissertation (1998) for a comprehensive discussion of the realignment of party apparatuses after the economic reforms and the use of nationalism to cover up unwanted problems brought by economic liberalization.

The CMRP data set used in this research contains 2,594 party programs from 54 countries. The current list of party programs by nation in the CMRP data set is presented in Table 1. Each party program in this data set has been classified into one of the 10 pre-defined party families: Socialist, Ecologist, Social Democrat, Liberal, Christian Democrat, Conservative, Agrarian, National, Ethnic, and Single Issue. The classification was done based on the programs' profile similarity. Each program had been content-analyzed using the CMRP coding scheme, and its profile was recorded. Party programs with profiles most similar to one another were then grouped into one of the 10 party families.

The CMRP coding frame includes 56 basic variables which compose 22 exclusive categories, covering seven domains of policy preferences from domestic to international concerns: external relations, freedom and democracy, political system, economy, welfare and quality of life, fabric of society, and social groups (Volkens 2001a). The categories and their sub-categories are listed in Table 2. The coders divide the text into quasi-sentences, each containing one unit of idea. Then each quasi-sentence is coded into one and only one of the 56 sub-categories.[5] The sub-categories are then re-combined into the 22 categories.

The current research uses the 2001 revision of the coding scheme previously tested (Volkens 2001b). The scheme includes a reliability test, detailed description of the 56 sub-categories to be coded, and instructions for coders. I use the entire scheme for the CPV program. The coded CPV program is then entered into the existing CMRP data set for comparison.

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[5] To increase inter-coder reliability, the coders are asked to study the handbook and work on a standard text. Coders are trained so that deviations from the standard coded text could be reduced (Volkens 2001b). The coding scheme relies on face and predictive validity. This means that coding results should make sense in the historical and political context within the country and across countries. As a cross-check in methodology, trained coders working on well-tested scheme produced much more reliable and valid results than expert surveys (McDonald and Mendes 2001).

The CPV Program in Comparative Context

Multi-party systems are the trademark of democracy where more than one parties compete for votes in elections. A single-party system is characteristic of authoritarian regimes that do not allow opposition force to form parties and compete legally on the political arena. Both systems, however, produce scripts of their actions in forms of political programs.

In a representative democracy, the linkage among government-parties-voters seems to be self-evident. As an intermediary organ, "[p]olitical parties are the major actors in a system that connects the citizenry and the governmental process." (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994: 5). Parties write political programs to make claims about their own agenda and to represent different constituents' interests (Klingemann 1987). The political programs help voters determine which parties or candidates to support in the elections. Through their competition for votes, political parties respond to social demands by producing policies. Governmental policies, as numerous studies have shown, mirror much of the political programs issued by parties (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Hofferbert and Klingemann 1990; Wagschal 1998; Thomson 2001). The people living under authoritarian regimes, however, do not have such voice in selecting whomever they want to represent them or whatever issues they deem important to them. There is no real electoral competition in the single-party countries.

The coded content of political programs in the CMRP data set helps demarcate the boundaries of the CPV program and to what extent the CPV programmatic content is comparable to party programs in a multi-party system.

The CPV Program Content Summary

Six decades since the founding of the CPV, the Seventh National Congress issued the second political program in 1991 titled, "Political Program for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism."[6] The CPV describes the program as "a banner in the struggle for victory of the cause of building Vietnam in its gradual transition to socialism." Thus, the CPV requests that "all communists and compatriots at home and abroad to devote all their spirit and energies to the successful implementation of this Political Program." Unlike countries where elections are free and competition exists among parties, the CPV does not have to ask the Vietnamese citizens to comply with its political agenda; it "calls upon" them to do so. Yet one could see, as reflected throughout the program's text, the Party's willingness to adapt to social changes by engaging in self-criticism and finding ways to fix erroneous policies of the past.

The first section of the program, "The Revolutionary Process and Lessons Drawn from Experience," is devoted to describing a brief history of the CPV from the first political program issued in 1930 through the wars for independence until Vietnam was reunited in 1975. The text describes how the Party has erred in policy-making while trying to search for a socialist orientation. Therefore, as the leading force of Vietnam, the CPV has reformed itself, and objectives as well as future directions are provided as general guidelines.

"Transition to Socialism in Our Country" is the next section where the CPV analyzes the failure to maintain socialist systems in the former Soviet bloc and realizes that Vietnam is going to advance to socialism after its passage through the capitalist system. All of this is tempered by the democratic environment that the government claims to have created for its people. For the

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[6] The 1991 CPV program has been translated into English and is publicly displayed at the party's website: www.cpv.org.vn

CPV, the current period of reform is merely conforming to a means that would achieve the socialist end.

More specifically, the third section titled "Major Directions for Socio-economic, National Defense and Security, and Foreign Policies" draws up directions for these three areas. In the socio-economic realm, the emphasis is put on the development of a "socialist-oriented mixed commodity economy," which is an economy where self-interests of private enterprises are tempered by the consideration for national and mass interests. To advance the economy, the importance of education, science, and technology are stressed. In terms of foreign policy, the CPV is resolved to maintain peace and international security. The state sector is to play a leading role in all of these aspects.

The last section titled "The Political System and the Party's Leading Role" reinforces the notion that the CPV is supreme in the judicial, legislative, and executive branches as "a body expressing and exercising the will and power of the people, and on behalf of the people." There is a paradoxical statement about the relationship among the three branches of government, "The Vietnamese State represents the unity of *the three arms of government* – legislative, executive and judicial – with a clearly defined separation of powers." The CPV is also the leader of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, an army organization of Vietnam. All other mass organizations are also under the umbrella of the CPV and carry functions such as mass mobilization as specified by the CPV leadership. This section basically shows that state-society autonomy is almost non-existent, and the CPV maintains a monopoly of power and leadership in Vietnam.

Throughout the CPV's program, the themes of national independence, national unity, cultural preservation, cultural enrichment, and similar nationalistic keywords have been

interwoven into the socialist agenda. Vietnam is preparing herself to enter the era of globalization, where identity matters for commercial reasons.

By analyzing its program, I argue that the CPV is a pragmatic single party not because it lacks a guiding ideology (as Sartori would claim) but because it uses both socialist and nationalist ideologies to its advantage, that is, to maintain a strong grip on power. Particularly, the nationalist ideology has been recycled in the latest program to promote a liberalized economy away from the original socialist stance. The analysis that follows uses the CMRP coding scheme and data set.

Codeability

There were 120 of 421 quasi-sentences uncodeable in the CPV program, leaving approximately 70% coded using the CMRP scheme. The number of uncodeable quasi-sentences in this case is above average compared to the rest of the party programs in the data set. The total number of quasi-sentences in each party program ranges from 0 to 7,366, with a mean of 364 and a mode of 61 quasi-sentences per program. The percentage of uncodeable quasi-sentences for each program ranges from 0 to 89 percent, with an average of 7 percent uncodeable. About one-thirds of the programs do not have any quasi-sentences uncodeable.

The content of the uncodeable quasi-sentences in the CPV program (a) reinforces the notion that the CPV is the sole and most powerful leader of the country in war and peace time throughout the contemporary history of Vietnam, (b) reveals CPV's effort to fix errors of the past, (c) describes the reasons for the fall of the Soviet bloc, and (d) defines the CPV's general socialist objectives. These quasi-sentences were considered uncodeable because their content could not fit any of the 56 sub-categories aforementioned. In other words, the above themes are

unique to a program of a party monopolizing power, which is not covered by the coding scheme used for analyzing parties that compete in a multi-party system.

Mapping of Policy Preferences

The contours of the CPV policies may not match any of the parties in the data set. On the one hand, the CPV program has been updated to include more current preferences, reflecting Vietnam's willingness to be integrated into the world. On the other hand, the CPV program shows struggles to maintain a national and unique party identity. The kind of issues mentioned in the CPV program illustrated some of these concerns. The CPV program touches on 34 out of the 56 sub-categories of the standard coding frame (Table 2).

In the first policy domain, External Relations, the CPV program concentrates on describing internationalism as positive as well as maintaining special relationships with other Communist countries. At the same time, strong statements of anti-imperialism and pro-military approaches in safeguarding the homeland co-exist with wishes for peace in the world. There is no mention of negativity toward any particular countries or the process of globalization.

Fewer statements existed in the domain of Freedom and Democracy. Although democracy, freedom, and human rights are mentioned, the intended meanings must be different from those of the West. Vietnam practices democratic centralism, so the notions of freedom and human rights are not inclusive of all beliefs and behaviors. Indeed, only ideologies that fit the central framework of a "civilized society which cares for the genuine interests and dignity of man and aims at ever higher intellectual, ethical, physical and aesthetic standards" would be tolerated. All other "retrograde ideology and culture, which runs counter to the fine traditions, the noble values of mankind, and the path to socialism" should be fought against (CPV program,

section II). The use of a constitution to avoid abuses of power is mostly neglected in the CPV

program. Only once has the Constitution been mentioned as a means to limit the Party's

leadership. The Constitution is theoretically placed above the Party's authority.

The Party monopolizes power through its leadership over the political system, which it

asserted clearly in the program. In the Political System domain, more instances where

centralization is stressed than decentralization. More emphasis is placed on political authority

than governmental and administrative efficiency. Nothing is mentioned in terms of combating

political corruption even though the problem evidently exists in Vietnam (International

Transparency Index rated Vietnam as one of the most corrupt countries in 2002).

Consistent with the Party's emphasis on economic growth, several statements in the

program have been reserved to discuss issues relevant to the economy. Yet, in reflecting the

socialist orientation of a market economy unique to Vietnam, statements of Marxist analysis,

nationalization, and market regulation coexist with praises of free enterprise, incentives,

productivity, and economic goals to achieve these ends.

The Party also pays much attention to general welfare. In the domain of Welfare and

Quality of Life, numerous sentences were coded for environmental protection, preservation of

culture, social justice, welfare state expansion, and education expansion. This domain shows a

consistent socialist party orientation.

A large number of sentences were coded under the Fabric of Society domain, showing

Party's interests in directing the society's development. More than any other categories or

domains, strong emphasis is placed on social harmony. Next is a reinforcement of positive view

on the national way of life. The only instance where national way of life is deemed negative is

when it crushes other ethnic identities. However, much less attention is paid on

multiculturalism, which is relevant for Vietnam since the country has 54 ethnic minorities.

Lastly, only two sentences were coded in the Social Groups domain. Labor groups

receive their glory once, and the peasants also have their equal share. Nothing addresses the

middle class or professional groups. Ethnic groups are mentioned but were coded in the Fabric

of Society domain under multiculturalism.

Comparability

Beside the relatively high attrition rate from uncodeable quasi-sentences, the rest of the

program text fit quite well qualitatively with more than half of the sub-categories provided by the

CMRP coding scheme. Hence, at least from this vantage point, the CPV program could be

deemed as comparable in addressing a number of themes as programs from other countries.

One discriminant analysis was performed for each party family to figure out which of the

10 families the CPV belongs given the known classification of other parties. In each of the 10

runs, all 2,594 party programs were entered simultaneously into the analysis. The predictors

included the 22 categories from Table 2. The CPV was then classified as either belong to or not

belong to a party family based on its discriminant scores computed from the categories. There

are two ways to determine where the CPV belonged. First, the highest discriminant score from a

family means that the CPV belongs best in that family. Secondly, discriminant analyses produce

probabilities of classifying correctly a party into each family, so the higher the probabilities the

better the chances that the CPV has been classified correctly.

Among all parties, the CPV was classified into the Liberal and the Ethnic party families

with predictions slightly better than chance (52% and 54%, respectively). However, the CPV

found its home in the National party family (87%). The discriminant score was also highest for

the CPV in the National family, indicating that the CPV belongs there (See Table 3).

The most intriguing non-finding was that the CPV does not belong to the Socialist party

family, where most of the Communist and Socialist parties competing in multi-party systems

best fit this category. An example is the pre-classified 1993 program of the Communist Party of

France (PCF). The PCF was chosen for profiling because of its temporal proximity to the CPV

and its historical influence on Ho Chi Minh before he formed the CPV in 1930. It could be

classified neatly into the Socialist family (93%) as well as the Social Democrat family (89%), but

the PCF's profile has yet to be matching that of the CPV (Table 3).

Neither does the CPV suit the objectives of other pre-classified Social Democrat,

Christian Democrat, Conservative, Ecologist, Agrarian, or Single-Issue parties. Parties in these

families carry unique agendas that are distinguishable from the others.[7] The fact that the CPV

could not be classified into any of them demonstrates a level of validity of the coding scheme.

As benchmarks for comparison, now we should examine a sample of pre-classified

parties that the CPV closely matches its profile. The parties sampled here were not chosen based

on any historical or contextual linkage to the CPV. They were chosen based on their matching

profiles from a manual scan through the classification probabilities only for the purpose of

comparative analysis. The closest matches to the CPV program's profile are the 1994 program

of the Christian Democratic Peoples Front of Moldova (CDPF) and the 1989 program of the

New Democracy Party of Greece (ND). Both of them have roughly the same percentage

correctly classified into the Liberal, Ethnic, and National families (Table 3). Together with the

CPV, the CDPF and the ND parties received some of the highest percentages correctly classified

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[7] Discriminant analyses (not shown) confirmed that unique sub-categories from the content analysis loaded onto each party family.

into the National party family. As another reference points, two parties with pure National-

family classification are also sampled in Table 3. The 1990 program of the Romanian National

Unity Party and the 1970 program of the English Conservatives could only be classified as

National parties albeit slightly better than chance (62% and 53%, respectively). They do not

belong elsewhere, nor do they have a higher chance of being classified into the National family

better than the CPV.

While being developed to code parties in multi-party system, the CMRP has proven its

robustness when used to code single parties in mono-party system as well. This is an

encouraging, preliminary finding because the coding scheme helps provide a tool to tap a less

explored realm of mono-party policy preferences. Future studies should test the reliability and

validity of the coding scheme by exploring systematically a wide range of mono-party political

programs in a comparative context and across time.

Conclusion

The CPV program's classification provided some basis for looking at non-democratic, single-

party policy preferences. The analysis of the CPV program tends to confirm the survival strategy

of single-party programs; that is, they have to satisfy both the elitist and mass demand in coping

with changes within society and trends in international relations. However, insofar as there are

no parties to compete, the CPV may monopolize power and remain quite independent from

competitive pressure. The leaders of the CPV have more policy room to manipulate and achieve

what they want to accomplish in an authoritarian system, whereas countries with a multi-party

system may not do so easily because of inter-party pressure. This pressure might have pushed

the Communist Party of France further left and the Christian Democratic Peoples Front further

right as each assumes a more distinguishable public agenda from others surrounding it. Yet there

is no pressure for the CPV to become more socialist than it is.

By party family classification, the CPV program matches the interests of parties with

nationalistic tendency. This confirms an observation that the CPV "could readily wrap

themselves in the national flag" (Kerkvliet, Chan, and Unger 1999:6). The result is indicative of

the strong nationalist sentiment under which Communism was able to hide itself. In fact, the

tactic works in claiming legitimacy for the Party's continuous rule. From its birth in 1930 to

1975, the CPV, which assumed various names for different periods of operation, spearheaded

struggles against the French colonialists then the Americans under the Nationalist banner

(Nguyen Trong Phuc 2002). From 1975 when Vietnam was reunified until now, the CPV has

usurped the government's power and awarded itself the sole power to rule Vietnam, admitting no

opposition. The CPV program, indeed, reflects and reinforces the Party's wish to be the only

force leading the country.

The next question is what direction the CPV is leading Vietnam. The answer clearly is

not toward socialism or Communism at least in its 1991 platform. Although the CPV pays lip-

service to the socialist orientation throughout its program, the concept is without substance.

Otherwise, we would be able to observe a strict classification into the Socialist party family,

where the Communist and Socialist parties belong. Facing the inevitable trend of globalization,

the CPV is trying to catch up with the capitalist neighbors like Singapore and Thailand by

advertising Vietnamese products, people, and country on the global market. In so doing, the

CPV is abandoning its socialist content and saying farewell to the proletarian struggle

worldwide. Any existing tensions between market economy and central planning will eventually

be resolved, perhaps, in favor of the market as evident in the promotion of competition and free

market in the program's text. The ideological split in the proletarian struggle finds its way into the CPV's intention to make friends worldwide, even with former enemies like the imperialist United States and other capitalist countries. The CPV realizes the value of mutual cooperation and peace rather than calling for a united struggle of the developing countries against the developed part of the world.

Indeed, an outlook toward peace and cooperation is probably more practical than a call to arms these days. A market orientation also brings in more capital to an impoverished country than the failed command-economy experiment. On top of these agendas, the Communist Party of Vietnam once again crowns nationalism as an ideology for all pragmatic purposes while refusing to step down from power. Sartori had a precise term to describe it, a "pragmatic single-party system."

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Table 1. CMRP Party Programs by Country Distribution

Country	Number of Party Programs	Country	Number of Party Programs
Albania	30	Japan	78
Armenia	11	Latvia	24
Australia	80	Lithuania	23
Austria	54	Luxembourg	54
Azerbaijan	4	Macedonia	20
Belarus	8	Malta	4
Belgium	119	Mexico	55
Bosnia-Hercegovina	19	Moldova	4
Bulgaria	24	Montenegro	17
Canada	67	Netherlands	84
Croatia	25	New Zealand	58
Cyprus	6	Northern Ireland	33
Czech Republic	31	Norway	99
Denmark	201	Poland	43
Estonia	22	Portugal	56
Finland	98	Romania	31
France	66	Russia	29
Georgia	30	Serbia	31
German D.R.	14	Slovakia	29
Germany	66	Slovenia	17
Great Britain	48	Spain	50
Greece	37	Sri Lanka	13
Hungary	20	Sweden	98
Iceland	72	Switzerland	69
Ireland	60	Turkey	43
Israel	141	Ukraine	27
Italy	107	USA	45

Table 2. Content Analysis of the CPV Program

Category	Sub-Categories	Percentage
Freedom and Human Rights	Freedom and Human Rights	.71
Democracy	Democracy	1.43
Constitution	Constitutionalism: positive, Constitutionalism: negative	.24
Centralization	Centralization	2.38
Decentralization	Decentralization, Anti-Imperialism, Multiculturalism: positive	3.33
Modes of Government	Governmental and Administrative Efficiency Political Corruption, Political Authority	6.41
Market Economy	Free Enterprise, Incentives Market Regulation, Protectionism: negative Economic Orthodoxy	4.99
Planned or Mixed Economy	Economic Planning, Corporatism Protectionism: positive, Controlled Economy Keynesian Demand Management Marxist Analysis, Nationalization	5.23
Economic Infrastructure	Productivity, Technology and Infrastructure	4.28
Environmental Protection	Environmental Protection Anti-growth Economy	5.46
Agriculture	Agriculture	.24
General Economic Orientation	Economic Goals	2.14
Traditional Morality, Law and Order	Traditional Morality: positive Law and Order, Multiculturalism: negative	4.04
Cultural Libertarianism	Traditional Morality: negative	0
Welfare State Negative	Welfare State Limitation, Education Limitation Labor Groups: negative	0
Welfare State Positive	Culture, Social Justice, Welfare State Expansion, Education Expansion, Labor Groups: positive	9.98
Social Groups Politics	Middle Class and Professional Groups Minority Groups Non-Economic Demographic Groups	0
Military Strength	Military: positive	1.9
Peace and Detente	Military: negative, Peace	1.9
Nationalism	Internationalism: negative European Community: negative National Way of Life: positive, Social Harmony	10.45
International Cooperation	Internationalism: positive European Community: positive National Way of Life: negative	3.80
Special Relationships	Foreign Special Relationship: positive Foreign Special Relationship: negative	2.61
Uncoded		28.50
Total (421 quasi-sentences)		100

Table 3. Party Family Classification for Selected Parties (percentage correctly classified)

Year	Party* / Family	Socialist	Ecologist	Social Democrat	Liberal	Christian Democrat	Conservative	Agrarian	National	Ethnic	Single Issue
1991	*CPV***	38.86	0	33.01	51.52	19.06	23.05	6.52	87.28	54.22	1.66
		-.27	*.63*	*-.37*	*-.36*	*-.48*	*-.60*	*-.47*	*-1.99*	*-.76*	*-.92*
1993	*PCF*	93.42	0	88.74	18.84	11.79	6.10	6.80	9.73	29.72	5.91
1994	*CDPF*	23.80	0	39.99	68.73	28.48	37.11	1.97	84.08	54.52	0.30
1989	*ND*	40.72	0	25.15	50.42	6.66	42.29	13.18	98.27	50.87	2.22
1990	*PUNR*	34.66	0	40.51	47.39	28.93	25.03	17.33	62.28	27.82	2.62
1970	*CONS*	43.53	0	33.79	34.99	38.21	29.98	18.04	52.87	43.52	10.47

*Acronyms:

CPV   Communist Party of Vietnam (Vietnam)
PCF   Communist Party of France (France)
CDPF Christian Democratic Peoples Front (Moldova)
ND   New Democracy (Greece)
PUNR National Unity (Romania)
CONS Conservatives (United Kingdom)

**Italicized entries are raw discriminant scores for the CPV.